

## The Conservative Heavy Division: Enlisted Impact

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The heavy division reorganization has now been made public by the Chief of Staff of the Army. Supporting articles have been published in both professional and civilian publications. Briefings and interviews have been presented. A web site has been brought on line. I hope that you have read and accessed these media, and are familiar with the changes to the heavy brigade and the tank battalion. I will quickly review the changes to unit structure and then detail the armor and cavalry enlisted authorizations gained and lost, with likely impact on professional development and promotion.

There will still be six heavy divisions. All will have three brigades and a division cavalry squadron. Five divisions will contain five armored and four mechanized battalions. One division will contain four armored and five mechanized battalions.

Each heavy brigade will contain a brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) of two scout platoons, each with six HMMWVs. The platoons are organized into a two-vehicle headquarters and two scout sections of two vehicles each.

Each tank battalion will have 45 M1-series tanks, organized into three tank companies and the battalion headquarters tanks. Loss of a tank company is the price of retaining the four-tank platoon. The battalion scout platoon will be reduced to six HMMWVs. The HHC loses the support platoon to the forward support company, which is assigned to the forward support battalion.

The division cavalry squadron retains three ground troops, each with nine M1-series tanks and 13 M3 CFVs (totals are 27 M1s and 41 M3s, including HHT).

So much for the structure; now for the impact on enlisted authorizations. Before I go further, understand that the authorizations coming out of the division's structure are not necessarily coming out of the total armor and cavalry force. We have plans to use the excess authorizations to fill other needs within our branch. These authorizations, if available, will be for use on the TDA side of our force, and could help fill the need for more drill sergeants, recruiters, instructors, etc. While this could increase an NCO's time in the various nominative assignments, armor branch will continue to manage our NCO development in order to give opportunities for leadership certification to every soldier at each grade. My centralized board guidance may change, as the impact of restructuring the total armor and cavalry force is better understood. Nominative assignments may have to be given more credit, as the boards select the best of the fully qualified for promotion.

There is minor impact on cavalry scouts. Taking into account the losses to each existing scout platoon, and the gain of the 18 BRTs, MOS 19D gains a total of 54 authorizations on the TOE side; 18 NCO and 36 Skill Level 1 (SL1). Cavalry scouts gain 36 SFC authorizations and lose 18 SSG authorizations, with no change to SGT authorizations.

There is major impact on armor crewmen. MOS 19K loses 696 NCO authorizations from the TOE side, of which 87 are SFC, 203 are SSG, and 405 are SGT; 870 SL1 authorizations are also lost.

Senior armor crewmen lose 29 1SG authorizations from the TOE side.

In the short term, there will be a promotion slowdown. The fight to avoid any

"non-select" boards will have to be fought. There will be a higher level of fill in some units, for the personnel system will need time to catch up with the changes and gradually move soldiers to understrength units, as well as to the increased number of TDA authorizations. The promotion slowdown will not be as bad for scouts, because the selection rate for SSGs will temporarily increase to fill the need for SFCs. There is a possibility for reclassifications or early outs to reduce overages of 19K soldiers. SL1 armor crewmen will certainly face reclassification or early out, for there will be relatively few 19K SL1 authorizations moved to TDA units.

Over the long term, MOS 19K will even out, since the reduction in TOE authorizations occurs proportionally among all grade levels. A healthy pyramid of professional development and promotion will be restored and maintained.

Implementation of CHD structure is beginning in 4ID. The timeline for reorganization of all divisions is still being worked. If done gradually, soldiers can be moved to fill understrength units and excess authorizations can be relocated into TDA units. If done quickly, it will be much harder to take care of our soldiers. In either case, we NCOs must implement the decisions of our leaders to reorganize the division. With new and more lethal weapons, and with improved systems for situational awareness and command and control, our units can be more effective. However, they will be more effective only if filled with well-trained and motivated soldiers at all grades. That is our mission: to understand, explain, motivate, train.

"SERGEANT, TAKE THE LEAD"